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454 SOUZA V. CORTI [22 C.2d 
employment and of mutual benefit both to employer and 
employee. 
"Resp~ndent San Francisco Bay Area Council, Inc., Boy 
Scouts .0fAmerica, urges in support of the judgment that it 
is a charitable' non-profit corporation an.d should as such. be 
exempt from liability for the torts of its employees. A care" 
·ful reading of Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Ca1.2d 762 [97 
P.2d 798] and England v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 14 
CaI.2d 791 [97 P.2d 81~1 satisfies us that, while the precise 
question before the court in those cases was the liability of a 
cha:dtable' hospital to a paying patient, the effect of those 
decisions is to impose on charitable organizations in generl!-l 
the same liability for the negligence of employees as exists, in 
the case of other empioyers." 
In my opinion the judgment should be reversed. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 5, 
1943. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[So F. No. 16866. In Bank. July 8, 1943.] 
THERESA SOUZA et aI" Appellants, V. JO~ CORTI 
et a1.; J:)efendants; JOSEPH GIGLI et a1., Respondents. 
[1] Automobilea-Persons Liable-Lender or Bailor-Purpose ot 
Statute:--'-Veh. Code, § 402, defines an autom:obile ownEll;'evlia-
bility'in cases where the, principle of respondeat supetior jsin. 
applicable,' in order to' make him liable' for, the negli.genCE! of 
any person to whom he has expressly or impliedly given per-
missioll to o'perat~ his, car,l;I.nd thereby prev!)nthim, trom esc~p,~ 
ingliability by saying that, his ,car was being used without 
e~ress authorityo:r not'inhis business. ' 
[2] Id.--,-Per~ons I.iabJe-:-Parent-.,--Permission to Use ,'. Car'-'y:iola-
ticin ot:Rest~ctions on Mode, otUse~-Where the owner of an 
automobile conse~ted ,to its use by his son, and such eonsent 
covered the nse01:the :cal",at,the time,of its colli!lion~th 
andthe:r'car, the f,ather was liable und,er' "tT eh.Code, §'402, for 
[1] See2Cal;J~i'. Te~~yearSupp. 478; 5.Anl.Jur. 697. 
Melt,. Pig. ,Relerences; . [1], Automobiles, § 167 (1); [2] Automo-
biles,§160; [3] Automobiles, § 168. 
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[3] 
negligence in the operation of, his car, alth'ough h13 had forbid~ 
den ,~his son to, allow another to. operate it and his son'had" 
disobeyeg such admonition, as a violation of,. any''restri~tion 
as to, the manner of the car's, nse did not cause a.revocation. 
ofthefathe:r's permission. ' 
Id.-Persons ,Liable-Principal's Liability for Negligence,' of, 
Agent.--Where the owner of -an .automobile gave pe~ssioii 
to his son ,to use it on a certain evening; and where, dUring' 
that evening, another person took, possession, cif 'the ear }or 
the use,. ,benefit and aCCOmri1o~ationand under,' the" d~ction 
of the son for the purpose of taking the car to a ,certain place 
fOl."the son; an agencyrelationshipexiSiild' between the -son: 
and such other person, and the negligence ofihe latter in 
driving the car was imputable to the son. ' 
APPEAL,from a judgment of the Superior Court of A1a~ 
meda County. John J. Allen,Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for injuries resUlting from collision of, 
motor vehicles. Judgment for certairi defendants reversed. 
Van A. Neher and Phillips & Munck :eor Appellants. 
Myron ,Harris, William H. 0lderand John Jewett Earle 
for'Respondents. 
. SHENK, J,-This is an action for 'damages for. person,a! 
injuriesresultirig' from an automobile collision; Judgment 
wasenter'ed hi favor, of each of the pliiinti:fi~ againstth~d~ 
'fendant' 'John Corti and in favor of the defendants :J osei>~' 
and 'A.rthur' GigIl, father .,and son. - Tht.' plahitiffs, appeal~d 
from the judgment in so far as it is favorable tO,the .defend~~ 
ants Gigli. , ' ' " , , . ' '. 
The appe~l jnvolvestheconstruction, as applied, t6'th~, 
uni:liSput~d facts, of sectIon 402 of the Vehicle' dode,'tIle; 
pertineriipart of which is 'a~ follows: "Every ow,nerol ,~" 
in,btor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death. of or' 
injury to person or proper'tyrestP.ting froI;D. negligence in 
the operation 'of such motor vehicle, in the buSiness of such: 
owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the 
same <oWith the permission,express ,or implied; of ,such,' 
- ." , . '" 
owner. ,,~ , ~ .'
Joseph Gigliwas the owner of 'a Dodge sedan. He housed 
the car in the garage at his home where he and 'hisfaDrliy; 
, . 
" ii, ;," 
" , ' 
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including Arthur and a younger son, re~ided, The ke~s were 
reft in the car and membe:r;s' of the family were permItted to 
,use it. The son Arthur conducted a service station at San 
Leandro. He had general permission to ase his father's car 
and had used it on an average of twice a week for a year and 
a half. On the evening of Saturday, July 6, 1940, Arthur 
loaned his own car to the' younger brother. At a later hour 
Arthur desired to go out with his friend, the defendant John 
Corti, so he sought and obtained permission from his father 
to use the Dodge car. The father testified that Arthur asked 
him for the use of the car on that evening and that he granted 
permission, to use it but with the admonition: "Don't lend 
the car to anyone else." Arthur took th,~ c.ar an~ in comp~ny 
with Cortf stopped at Rocca's, a liquor dlspensmg estab~Ish­
merit and dance hall. From there the two proceeded to a mght 
spot.known as Bruno's where they met two girls with whom 
they had not theretofore been acquainted. Later they decided 
to return to Rocca's and dance. , Arthur suggested that the 
four go in the Dodge car. Arthur's girl objected because she 
had a new Plymouth coupe with her and did not want to leave 
it behind. Neither did Arthur wish to leave his father's car. 
I.n order to get the two cars to Rocca 's a~d to ~ake. sur.e t~e 
girls would show up, Arthur deCided to rIde WIth hIS gIrl III 
the Plymouth. Accordingly he handed the keys of the Dodge 
to Corti who agreed -to take the other girl in that car and 
"follow" the Plymouth car to Rocca's. The collision in which 
the plaintiffs were injured occurred on the return trip to 
Rocca's when the Dodge car, driven by Cort.i, collided with 
the plaintiff's car at the intersection of E~t 14th Str~et .a?-d 
Dutton Avenue in San Leandro. The neghgence and habIlIty 
of Corti is not disputed. The principal question is wheth,er 
Joseph Gigli, the owner of the Dodge car, is liable in damages 
for the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs pursuant to the 
statute above quoted. He contends that he is not liable be-
Gause he had not given express permission to Corti to drive 
the car and that permission so to do may not be implied for 
the reason that he instructed his son Arthur not to lend the 
car to anyone else. 
The portion of the statute now under consideration was 
enacted in 1929 and was then included in section 17141,4 of 
the Civil Code (Stats. 1929, p. 566). Its constitutionality is 
not questioned. (See Sutton v. Tanger, 115 Cal.App. 267 [1 
July 1943] SOUZA 1). CORTI 
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P.2d 521], O'Neill v. Williams, 127 Cal.App; 385 [15 P.2d 
879].) [1] The statute defines the owner's liability in 
cases wherc the' principle of respondeat superior is inapplica-. 
ble, in order to make him liable for the negligence of any 
person to whom he had expressly or impliedly, given per" 
mission to operate his car, and thereby prevent l1iIh fro:mes-
caping liability by saying that his car was being used without 
express. authority or not in his business. (BayZess'v. Mull, 50 
Cal.App.2d 66 [122 P.2d 608] ; PZaumbo v. Ryan, .213 App. 
Div.517 [210 N.Y.S. 225].) , , ' , 
By a New York statute adopted in 1924 (NewYork)Iigh-
way Law, 1924, ch. 534, sec. 282-e) liabilityw8simposed on 
the owner similar to that prescribed by section. 402 :of our 
Vehicle Code. In FeUeZberg v. Matuson, 124 :&lisco 595 [208 
N. Y. S. 786], the defendant owner, permitted one Mishldn 
to use his car. The accident occurred while' Mishkin. and 
some of his friends occupied the car. The driver was not 
Mishkin but one' of his party. After upholding the consti-
tutionality of the statute the court said: "The defendant 
also claims that the plaintiff cannot ,recover for the reason 
that' the person to whom the car was loaned did not drive 
the car. The statute says, however, that the owner should be 
liable for the acts of any person legally 'using or operating 
the same.' The words are used disjunctively. The legisla-
ture drew a distinction between 'using' and 'operating.' To 
operate, as distinguished from use, signifie&a personal act 
in working the mechanism of the car (Witherstine V. Em-
ployers' Liability Assurance Corporation, 235 N.Y. 168, 172 
[139 N.E. 229, 28 A.L.R. 1298].) As there stated: 'The driver 
operates the car for the owner, but the owner does not dperltte' 
the car unless he drives it himself.' What was the purposei 
of adding the word 'use' unless it was meant to include thei 
person who had the actual, though not physical, control of the 
car, and who was ~onstituted by the owner its master ad hoc. 
If the liability of the owner were limited to the acts of t1,lc; 
operator, the statute would become a dead letter inmost CRSes.·' 
Its evasion would be an easy matter. The statute mlll!t be 
interpreted iIi. accordance with its verbiage. We'c'annot hold' 
that 'using' and'operating"are interchangeable 01" synony-
mous words. I:f the owner chooses to intrust his car to·another 
person, he invests such person so long as he uses the <mr; with 
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which the owner has. That authority includes e right to 
select the operator. The statute so prQvides in un istakable 
language. " The court in that case also said: "Of ourse, the 
liability of the owner ceases, when the borrower, jn urn, gives 
the use of the car to a third party without the o' er's con-
sent." That statement was obiter, and in making i the court 
was merely emphasizing the distinction, under the New York 
law, between use and operation. 
In Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158 [156 N.E. 650 54 A.L.R. 
845], Carucci, an employee of the defendant 0 er, was in 
charge of a truck as driver, accompanied by a. sal sman. He 
permitted the salesman, who was neither experie ced, com· 
petent nor licensed as a driver, to opera.te the ve icle, while 
the driver rode on the running board. An accide t occurred 
resulting in damage to the car of a third party. he defen-
dant owner was held liable, first, on the common I w liability 
for the negligence of the owner's authorized rep esentative. 
On a second ground the court,speaking through Cardozo, 
then Chief Judge, said at page 164: "Passing from common 
law to statute, we find the owner's liability not merely con" 
tinued, but extended. By Highway Law (sec. 282-e) 'Every 
owner of a motor vehicle operated upon a public highway 
shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person 
or property reSUlting from negligence in the operation of such 
motor vehicle,in the business of such owner or otherwise, by 
any person legally using or operating the same with the per-
mission, express or implied, of such owner.' 'Use' as well as 
'operation' may thus fasten liability upon the owner under 
the provisions of the statute (Fl1legel v. Coudert, 244 N.Y. 
393 [155 N.E. 683]). This truck was intrusted by the defen-
qant to Carucci, his driver, to be 'used' in the transportation 
of persons and property to and from a stated point. It was in 
use for that purpose and no other when the accident occurred. 
The defendant expected, to be sure, that Carucci would. 
operate the truck as well as use it. None the less, use without 
more would entail liability for negligence. The statute may be 
said in a general way to have brought about the same results 
as had been attained in some other jurisdictions without refer-
ence to any statute by the so-called doctrine of 'the family 
automobile' (Fluegel v. Coudert, supra; Ferris v. Sterling, 
214 N.Y. 249 [108 N.E. 406, Ann. Cas. 1916D,1l61], at p. 
252). Only a narrow construction would permit us now to say 
that an owner pl!J.Cing a carin the care of members of· his 
July 1943] SOUZA V. CORTI 
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family to be used for their pleasure or for the family business 
WOUld. escape liability if wife or son or daughter should giyc 
over the wheel to the management of a·friend. The l'.iling has 
been more liberal whenever the question has come up (Kayser 
v. Van NestJ 125 Minn. 277 [146N.W. 1091,.51 L;R.A.N.S. 
970] ; Thixton v. Palmer, 210 Ky. 838 [276 S.W. 971,44 A.L.R. 
1379J; Ulman v. Lindeman, 44 N.D. 36, 41 [176 N.W. 25, 10 
A.L.R. 1440]). Carucci did not abandon the car or its u,,'!e 
when he surrendered to another the guidance of the' wheel. ' 
He was still in charge of the truck, and was using it with the 
permission of the master, and even in the master's business. 
He did not cease to use it, and use it with permission, though 
the method of operation may have been illegal or forbidden.' 
We think the effect of the statute is to read into our law the 
rule of liability laid. down in Geiss v. Twin City Taxicab Co., 
(120 Minn. 368 [139 N.W.611, 45L.R.A.N.S. 382]). The 
owner is now liable, though the negligence of the substitute 
may have been 'sudden and unexpected' (Ricketts v. Tilling, 
supra) if the act of negligence occurs during the life of the 
permitted use. Carucci was delinquent, but he was still the 
director of the enterprise, still the custodian of the instru· 
mentality confided to his keeping, still the master of the ship. ", 
A law similaT to the New York statute and to our own has 
. been in effect in Michigan since 1915. A proviso contained 
therein "that the owner shall not be liable unless said motor 
vehicle is being driven by the express or implied consent or' 
knowledge of such owner," has been uphel~ and construed in 
harmony with our present conclusion. (Kerns v. Lewis 246 . . . , , 
Mich. 423 [224 N.W. 647] ; see also K,ieszkowski v. Odlewany, 
280 Mich. 388 [273 N.W. 741].) The court in the case of 
Kerns v. Lewis declined to read into the statute the restriction 
that the particular 'driver must be knoWn by and his driving 
consented to by the owner. In Hawkin8v~ Ermatinger; 211 
Mich; 578 [179 N.W. 249], the provision of a statute declaring 
that the consent of the owner of a car to its use will be con-
clusively presumed when the same is driven by an immediate 
member of his family was held constitutional'as within the 
police power of the state. 
In the absence of statutory liability in the State of Wash-
ington the courts have adopted the "family use" doctrine to' 
hold the parent responsible when a third,person was driving 
even though the parent gave specific instructions that the 
460 SOUZA V. CORTI [22 C.2d 
third person should not drive the ca,r. (King v. Cann, 184 
Wash. 554 [52 P.2d 900].) ." . 
The courts of this state have not recogmzed the dlstInctIOn 
made in such cases as Owen v. Gruntz, 216 App.Div. 19 [214 
N.Y.S. 543], and Stapleton v. Hertz Drivurself Stations Inc.; 
131 Misc.R. 52 [225 N.Y.S. 661], where the car was turned 
over to a third person by the permittee. In the case of 
Haggard v. Frick, 6 Cal.App.2d 392 [44 P.2d 447], th; defe~­
dant gave the use of a car to his son who was attendmg u~l.l­
versity, with the instruction not to. permit"anyon~ else to drlve 
it. The son violated the instruction, an ' permltted another 
student to take the car and drive it for his own purposes. ' An 
accident occurred while the car was so being driven.. The 
District Court of Appeal relied on several ,cases in this a~d 
other jurisdictions, including Grant v. Knepper, supra, In 
arriving at the conclusion that an owner is liable for the negli-
gence of a person to whom his permittee has entrusted the 
automobile temporarily. 
In Bayless v. Mull, 50 Ca1.App.2d 66 [122 P.2d 608),. in a 
discussion of the general principles, it was said at page 72, 
"that the legislature did not intelld by the language it used to 
permit an owner to show any and all restrictio~s ~~ m~r have 
placed on the use of his car and thus escape lIabllIty. And 
again on page 75 the view of ma~y court;s ~~s stated to ~he 
effect that "as the owner can aVOld the lIabllIty byrefusmg 
to permit the use of his motor car by anothe;r or procu~e 
insurance to protect him, he should not be permltted to avold 
the consequences of the operator's negligence and escape lia-
bility therefor by secret restrictions limiting the right to use 
the motor vehicle." 
The cases of Boland v. Gosser, 5 Cal.App.2d 700 [43 P.2d 
559], and Howland v. Doyle, 6 Cal.App.2d 311 [14 P.2d 453], 
involved third party drivers,. and the owner was held not 
liable. But in each of those cases the permittee was not given 
the general use of the vehicle. He had the car I)r truck to 
make c~rtain repairs or tests, but turned it over to another for 
the purpose under circumstances which indicated that sUC? 
delegation was not contemplated by the owner. However, If 
it may be said that there is anything stated in those cases 
which is not in harmony with the views expressed herein, it is 
necessarily disapproved. 
[2] In the present case the use which was being made of 
the borrowed car at the time of the accident was the use which 
was contemplated by the owner. Any secret restrictions im-
.ruly 1943] SOUZA v. CORTi 
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posed by him on the manner of its use do not negative the 
. controlling fact that it was being used with the owner's per-
mission at the time of the accident. Violations of such restric-
tioIllS may not be said to cause a revocation of the permission. 
Liability of the defendant owner in this case pursuant to 
section 402 of the Vehicle Code is therefore established. Cases 
such as Engstrom v. Auburn Auto Sales Corp., 11 Ca1.2d64 
[77 P.2d 1059], Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Ca1.2d 526 [75 P.2d 
1051], ,and Di Rebaylio v. Herndon, 6 Cal.App.2d567 [44 P.· 
2d 581], were concerned with violations of restrictions placed 
on the borrower. as to the purpose for and the.' time. within 
which the car was to be used. Further consideration need not 
now be given to those' cases for the reason that we have here 
no question concerning the use of the car for the purpOse or 
the period for which it was borrowed. 
[3] As to the liability of the defendant Arthur Giglf, the 
record shows that defendant Corti took possession of the Dodge 
car for the use, benefit and accommodation and under. the 
direction of Arthur and for the purpose of taking it to Rocca's 
for Arthur. Under these circumstances Arthur was the prin-
cipal and Corti was his agent. The negligence of the latter 
was therefore imputable to Arthur. . (Maberto v. Wolle, 106 
Cal.App.202 [289P. 218].) 
The judgment in favor of the defendants Gigli is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J . ....:..I concur in the judgment of reversal as to 
both Joseph Gigli and Arthur Gigli. In my opinion theevi-
dence fails to support the finding that John Corti, .in the 
operation of the automobile, was not the agent of Arthur 
Gigli. If John Corti was operating 'the car as the ,agent o~ 
Arthur Gigli, then the use of the car was that of Arthur 
Gigli. Regardless of the asserted admonition by Joseph Gigii 
(the father) to Arthur (his son) not to permit anyone else to 
drive it, he did consent to its use by Arthur. The situation is 
substantially the same as though the father had admonishe!i 
the son not to operate the vehicle negligently. As Arthur was 
"using" the car at the time of the accident, its use was within 
the consent given by the father, even though Arthur had dis-
obeyed his father's instruction not to permit another to oper-
ate it. 
If Arthur had assumed to loan the vehicle to John for 
John's personal usage, as distinguished from that of Arthur., 
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we should have a different question, for which I suggest no 
answer here. 
When a person to whom an automobile has been entrusted 
embezzles it, and converts it to his own use in derogation OI 
the title of the owner, I think the owner should not be held 
fictionally to have consented to usage which he did not in 
fact consent to, either expressly or impliedly, But when the 
usage which the bailee makes of a borrowed vehicle does not 
· amount to a conversion OI it, his mere disobedience 0;' admoni-
tions as to his personal conduct in the operation of thE: auto-
· ~obile within the scope of the authorized .11se should not 
· exculpate the owner from the liability otherwise imposed by 
· the statute. 
In this case; Joseph Gigli consented to the use of the car by 
his son, and such consent covered the time and place in ques-
tion. The father, therefore, is liable for negligence in its 
operation white it was being so· used even though he had for-
bidden his son to allow another to operate it and his son had 
disobeyed such instruction. In the eyes of the law, by reason 
of the agency relationship, John Corti's operation of the auto-
mobile was Arthur Gigli's use of it. The consent of Joseph 
Gigli to such '!.Me (that is, use by Arthur) is all that is neces-
sary to fasten liability upon him for negligence in its opera-
tion. As long as the vehicle was being used by Arthur, 
whether personally or through his agent, Joseph cann()t avoid 
responsibility for negligence in its operation. 
TRAYNOR, J., dissenting and concurring.-Under section 
402 of the Vehicle Code the owner of a motor vehicle is not 
liable for ail injury resulting from the negligence of another 
unless the latter was using o~· operating the vehicle with the 
express or implied permission of the owner when the injury 
occurred. It is settled that the owner does not become liable 
under this section merely by entrusting control of the vehicle 
to another, for if he qualifies his permission by specifying that 
the vehicle is to be used for a limited time, for a particular 
purpose, or in a particUlar locality, and such limitations are 
substantially violated, the permission terminates. (llenrietta 
v. Evans, 10 Cal. 2d 526 [75 P.2d 1051]; Engstrom v. Auburn 
Auto Sales Corp., 11 Ca1.2d 64 [77 P.2d 1059] ; see 61 A.L.R. 
866; 83 A.L.R. 878; 112 A.L.R. 416; 136 A.L;R. 481.) When the 
owner grants permission, however, he cannot insure its termi~ 
nation upon the occurrence of an injury and thus defeat the 
purpose of the statute, by specifying that the vehicle is not to 
J 
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be used in a manner that could lead to injuries. It woUld'be 
an obvious circumvention of the statute if permission could 
terminate uport violation ofa· general instruction that the· 
vehicle was not to be operated negligently 6r, in any manner 
that would violate the Vehicle Code. It would be jUst as much 
fll circumvention jf the owner gave permission to use the 
vehicle subject to particular restrictions that would free him' 
from the risks of injury that normally attend use 018 motor 
vehicle. 
There is no circumvention of the statute, however, when an 
owner imposes restrictions to protect 'himself against undue 
risks, as when he restricts the use OI the vehicle to . certain 
times, places, or purposes. The object of sucl:. qualificati()ns is 
to limit the use of the vehicle,not to free· the oWner, from the 
risks that attend its use. The same object motivates the 
quaiification that the one who receiYes perrirission to use a 
vehicle must not allow arty one else to l],'~e it. It is more likely 
that this qualification would be made than any other, for an 
owner would hardly accord the privilege OI using the vehicle 
except to someone in whom he had confidence. When he takes 
the precaution to restrict the privilege to a single :(:crs()n; he 
refuses his consent to the. use of the vehicl6 by others and 
cannot properly be regarded as liable for injuries that might 
resUlt from such a use under a. statute that predicates the 
owner's liability on his consent to the use or ()peration of the 
vehicle ... A qualification that forbids the operation of the 
vehicle. by otherSl . also restricts the use of the vehicle by the· 
person entrusted with it. He is precluded not only from lend-
ing the vehicle to anyone else, but from using it In any way 
himself that would involve its operation by another except as 
compelled by emergencies or the exigencll:'s that arise in the 
normal use of a motor vehicle. Thus in the present case, the 
owner's qualification applied not only to Corti's use of the 
vehicle to transport himself and the gi:d that accompanied 
him to Rocca's but to Arthur Gigli's use of it by thus having 
it brought to him at Rocca's. I. therefore dis.'lent from the' 
judgment of reversal as to the owner,Joseph 'GiglL . 
I concur in the judgment .of reversal as to Arthur Gigli. 
There is no conflict in the evidertce that while Corti used the 
vehicle for his own purposes,he operated it at thesam~timeon 
behalf of Arthur Gigli in getting the vehicle to . Rocca.'s for 
him. He was thus. Arthur Gigli's agent regardlesso! the' 
accomplishment ()f his own pttrposes.(Brimberryv. DUdfieZd, 
,.' 
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Lumber Co., 183 Cal. 454, 462 [191 P. 8941; Ryan v. Farrell. 
208 Cal. 200, 204 [280 P. 945] j see Restatement, Agency, sec. 
236, California Annotations-171; Mechem on Agency (2J 
ed.) sec. 1895.) 
EDMONDS, J., dissenting.-I can see no basis recognized in 
law for enlarging the vicarious liability of an automobile 
owner to the extent stated by my associates. In my opinion, 
they have adopted a construction of section 402 of the Vehicle 
Code which ignores its express languag~ and is directly con-
trary to all former decisions of the California appellate courts. 
The conclusion now reached not only changes the rule as to 
the owner in the present case, but also, in effect, imposes a 
retroactive liability upon the respondents and other persons 
who have loaned their automobiles in reliance upon the former 
interpretation of the statute. And even more startling is the 
reversal of a judgment based upon findings of fact which, in 
turn, are supported by substantial evidence 
Indeed, the essential facts are not disputed. It appears that 
for the preceding 18 months, Joseph Gigli had loaned his 
Dodge sedan to his son on an average of twice each week, and 
when left in the garage at their home, the keys were not taken 
out of it. On the evening the accident occurred, Arthur asked 
his father to allow him to use the automobile. The father gave 
his consent; but, according to his testimony. told Arthur "not 
to loan the car to nobody else." He also s!.id he had directed 
Arthur "Not to leave anybody else use it" and to "Let 
nobody else drive it." These answers followed the form of the 
questions. But on cross-examination he was asked' whether all 
that concerned him was "that he didn't lend the car to some-
body else," "No it is not," was the rep:!.y. "What were you 
concerned with Y" counsel continued. Mr. Gigli answered: 
"Leave nobody drive it. " This was followed by the question: 
"Which is true, that you told him not to lend the car to 
somebody else and nothing else, or that you told him more 
than thaM" Mr. Gigli replied: "I told him not to leave any" 
body else drive the car." 
Following this conversation, Arthur took the automobile 
and with his friend, John Corti, went to Bruno's Inn; where 
they made the acquaintance of two ~rl~. The four subse-
quently agreed to go to Rocca's Inn, another roadhouse, to 
dance. Arthur suggested that they go in his father's sedan . ., 
I 
! 
July 1943] SOUZA V. CORTI 
[22 0.2d 4541 
465 
but his newly-found companion objected upon the ground that 
she did not want to leave her newPlymouth coupe at Bruno's. 
Arthur objected to leaving his father's car there. Corti then 
asked Arthur to give him the keys to the Dodge, saying that 
he and the other girl would follow the coupe to Rocca's. 
Arthur consented and rode with his girl in her Plymouth. 
The accident occurred on the way to Rocra's. 
The trial court found that the accident was caused solely 
by ~he negligence of Corti, but that he waSl, at the time of the 
a~Cldent, operating the automobile without the knowledge and 
WIthout the permission, express or implied,' of its owner 
Joseph Gigli. In addition, the court found that "at the tim~ 
and place of the collision . . . John Corti was not acting as 
the agent, servant or empl9yee of either or both of the defen-
dants Arthur Gigli and Joseph Gigli. " 
In considering the legal position. of Joseph Gigli as the. 
owner of the automobile, it is necessary first to determine the 
nature of the express condition which he imposed when he 
loaned the car. The only restriction placed upon the use of the 
car, assert the appellants, was, according to the father's testi-
mony, "not to loan the car to nobody else.'.' And the son 
they insist, did not loan the car to· anyone else but' allowed 
John Corti, to drive it for his benefit and accommodation. 
Assuming, however, that some of the evidence affords a basis 
for such a distinction, other testimony amply supports the.' 
trial court's conclusion as to the 'terms of the ,loan. Consider-
ing the entire record, it clearly appears, to have been Joseph 
Gigli's intention that Arthur should allow nc. one else to drive 
the car, a condition which Arthur fully understood. ' . 
By the terms of section 402 of the Vehicle Code "Every 
owner of a motor vehicle is liable and respoll.sible for the d.eath; , 
?f or injury.to person or property resulting from~eg1igenc~; 
III the operatIOn of such motor vehicle, in the business C)f such, 
o?er or othez:v~e, by any person using or operating the same 
WIth t~e permIs~lO~, e~press or implied, of such owner .•.. " . 
~here !s .no ambIgUIty In these words j the owner is liable only 
If the InJury. was .occasioned by the negligent operation 01 the. 
person who IS USIng or operating the motor vehicle with the 
permission of the owner. And the courts of California and of 
other states in considering this statute IJ.nc1 similar legislation 
have uniformly held that, when an owner allows another 't~ 
use his car but limits the use of the vehicle by the permittee, 
, ' 
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the latter is not "using or operating the Sbme with the per~ 
miSsion, eXpress or implied, of suchowrter" when he exceeds 
those limitations. (See, in general, annotations in 135 A.L.R 
481, ' 486-490; 112 A.L.R 416, 421-424; 83 A.L.R. 878, 881-
883; 6lA.L.R. 866, 872, 873.) Thus, in California, the courts 
have,Without exception, upheld restrictions upon the time, 
place or purpose of the permittee's use, and as to who may 
drive the automobile. (Time: Engstrom v. Auburn Auto Sales 
Oorp.,l1 Ca1.2d 64 [77 P.2d 1059] ; Di Rebaylio v. Herndon, 
6 Cal.App.2d 567 [44P.2d 581]. Place vr purpose: Henrietta 
v. Evans, 10 Cal.2d 526 [75 P.2d 1051]; cf. reasonable 
deviation froI\1 place of operation where no express restric· 
tion as to locality in Baylessv. Mull, ,50 CaLApp.2d 66[122 
P;2d 60B]. Persori: Brad/ordv.Sargent, 135 Ca1.App. 324, 
326[27 P.2d 93] ; Bold/ltd v.Gosser,5 CaLApp.2d 700 [43 
P.2d559] ; Howland v. Doyle, 6 CaLApp.2d 311 [44 P.2d 4531; 
Helmuth v. Frame, 46 Cai.App.2d381 [Jl5 P.2d 852].) , 
Assuming that" as stated, in the majority and concllrring 
opinions, the trier of facts acted unreasonably in concluding 
that Corti was not driving the car as th(> agent of Arthur 
Gigli, although the use of the car at the time of the accident 
may have been the uSe of Arthur, the question still remains, 
under the statute, whether that use by Arthur is a permitted 
one. For, as pointed out by this court very recently: "The 
fact of permisison is just as important as is the fact of oWner-
ship. If either is absent the statute does not operate." (Krum 
v. Malloy, ante, pp. 132,134 [137 P.2d 18].) 
It has been held that where the owner gives his express 
permission for the use of the car fora ceTtain purpose with~ 
out restriction as to who is to operate it in order to effect that 
purpose, the authority of the permittee may impliedly include 
the right to select the operator to carry out the permitted use 
(Haggard v. Frick, 6 Cal.App.2d 392 [44 P.2d 447]; Pohlev. 
Bolinas Beach R. Co., 130 Cal.App. 704 r20 P.2d 730] ; Sutton 
v.Tanger, 115 Oal.App. 267 [1 P.2d 521]), although the cir-
cumstances may be such as to negative such authority (How-
land v. Doyle, supraj and see Engstrom v. Auburn Auto Sale,~ 
Corp., suprajsee anno,tations in 112 A.L.R. 416, 424, 425 ;83 
A.L.R. 878, 884; 61 A.L.R. 866, 873-875). But, obviously, an 
expressed intention always supplants an implied one (Tanner 
v. Title Ins. &; Trust Co., 20 Ca1.2d 814, 824: [129 P.2d 383] ; 
Jones v. Interstate Oil Corp., 115 Cal.App. 302 [1 P.2d 1051] ; 
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Cliffe Co. v. Du Pont Eng. Co., 2~8 F. 649, 651 jand see 5 
Williston on Contracts [rev.ed. 1937], sec. 1293 n. 1, p. 3682.), 
and for that reason consent may not be implied when it is 
expressly withheld. " ' 
The factors required for a finding of either express', per-
mission or of implied consent have been stated in many cases. 
One of these is Bradford v. Sargent, supra, which, presente,d 
the same question as is now before the court. It was there 
shown that the owner of the car causing injury had .instr,!!cted 
his son that no one other than, a specified person should be 
allowed to drive it. The son allowed another boy to 4rive the, 
automobile and an accident resulted. A judgment against the 
owner was reversed. In determining that no permission con. 
templated by the statute had, been given, the court said: 
<, Express permission would necessarily incltide p:r;lor knowl~ 
'edge of the intended use and an affirmative an~actlve consent 
'to it. An implied consent would indicate a sufferance of use 
or a passive permission deduced from a failure to obje~t to a 
known past, present or intended future use under clrcum~ 
stances where the use should be anticipatea. Knowledge of 
some act or intended act on the part of the user by the owner 
should be necessary before consent to use should be implied." 
This decision, directly in point, is not dis~ussed in either the 
concurring opinion or that of the majority, although this, 
tlOurt denied a petition for hearing. 
And compare the conclusions upon which the judgment in 
the present case is reversed with Howland v,, Doyle, supra, 
p: 315, where the District Court of Appeal held: "Permissioll 
to drive a motor vehicle, implied as well ae express, such all 
is necessary to bring the case within section 1714%" [the 
predecessor of the statute nowheing considered], can oril~e~ist 
when the owner had knowledge or at least reason for behevmg 
that the vehicle would be driven by the person with whose 
ne~ligenco it is sought to charge him." Again a petition for 
helll.ri~g was denied by this court. It also denied a petition for 
hearing after the decision in Boland v. Gosser, supra. And 
both Howland v. Doyle and Bradford v. Sargent were ex· 
pressly approved by this court in Engst1'om v. Auburn Auto 
Sales Corp., supra, and Henrietta v. Evans. supra. The ma-
jority opinion, in attempting to distinguish Boland v. Gosser, 
supra, and Howland v. Doyle, from the present casesaystha~, 
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certain repairs or tests, but turned it )Ver to another for tke 
pt~rpose under circumstances which in:i.icuted that such dele-
gation was not contemplated by the owner." (Italics added.) 
But how may it be said that the delegation to Corti was con-
templated by the owner when Joseph Gigli had expressly for-
bidden any such delegation, and it is an uncontradicted fact 
that Arthur Gigli had never before allowed another to drive 
his fa.ther's carY 
The majority opinion also declares that· in the case of 
Haggard v. Frick, sttpra, the owner of 9.n automobile was held 
liable although his son violated the father's instruction not to 
permit anyone else to drive it. But in that case it appears 
that the father merely expressed the wish to his son that he 
"would rather he would not let any other pe~on drive" the 
car. In holding Frick, the owner, liable the court pointed out 
that he had "delivered the car to his son without direction or 
restriction as to its use other than the expressed wish that he 
would not let anyone else drive it. It was given, however, with 
the intention and understanding that the son should have the 
exclusive use and control of the cur throughout the college 
year, at a place more than four hundred miles from appel-
lant's home." Such precatory words do not constitute a 
limitation upon the authority of the permittee and the deci-
sion is simply one in accord with the rule which places within 
the authority of a permittee without restriction the right to 
select an operator to drive the car, with consequent liability 
upon the owner for negligent operation within the field of the 
permitted use. Yet this is the sole authority, so far as the 
cases in this state are concerned, upon which a majority of the 
court relies for a reversal of the judgment ill the present case. 
And, in quoting from the case of Bayless v. Mull, supra, their 
opinion ignores the fact that "there were no express restric-
tions or limitations" concerning the use of the automobile 
which caused injury and the court' placed its decision upon 
that ground. 
No logical distinction may be made between restrictions 
upon the purpose, time or place for which a.n automobile may 
be used and a limitation npon who may drive it. Indeed, the 
owner of an automobile may be principally concerned about 
the operator, for the skill and driving habits of a proposed 
borrower are usually of much more importance in determining 
whether one should be entrusted with an automobile than the 
I 
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length of time for or :he purpos.e of ~~e pr~p~.sed US? Yet ~ 
considering a restrictlOn upon time, ... It IS undisputed: 
said this court in the Engstrom case "that the only permIS-
sion given Herndon to use the car was that. he might have it 
for a particularly specified period. The a~cldent happened a 
day after this time expired. To hold that ~e~don was then 
driving the car with either the express or Imph~d consent of 
the owner would require us to disregard the plam agreement 
of the parties." The facts of the present cas~ are muc~ .more 
compelling in favor of the owner, for the undlsput.ed eVIdence 
is that at no time did he give' permission t~ Corti to use the 
car, and permission certainly may not be implied when he 
gave positive instructions to the contrary. 
The record in Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Ca~.2d 526 [75 P.2d 
1051], showed "a case of an origin,al permission for a li~ite~ 
use the scope of which was exceeded; and the questIon IS 
wh~ther the original express consent terminated prior to the 
accident by reason of the violation of the limitation." The 
owners entrusted their automobile to one Evans for the s~le 
purpose o~ driving the car to Beaumont to consummate Its 
sale there. Evans, however, continued on through Beaumont 
to Colton where the collision occurred. "There is no evi-
dence " s~id the court, "to show authorization to use the car 
for a~y other purpose or to drive it to any other place; on the 
contrary, the only testimony in the record i£ to the effect th~t 
any other use was expressly pr~hi~ite~. . . . The cas~ ~I~ 
formly hold that where the permISSion IS granted for a limlted 
time any use after the expiration of the period is without 
cons~nt, and the owner is not liable, unl~ss the circumstances 
justify an inference of implied consent to further use: ~ ... 
On principle, there is no fundamental groUf~ of dlStlllC-
tion between a limitation of time and one of puryoseor place, 
in so far as permission is concerned; and i! would seem ~lear 
that a substantial violation of either limitation' termina.~ the: 
original express consent and makes the subsequent use Wlthout 
permission. " The owners were held not liable. . . . 
Nor do the cases from other jurisdiction.~, cited in the ma-
jority opinion, support the conclusions there reached. Follow-
ing the rule adopted in California, they hold that consent to 
the use or operation of the motor vehicle by oneperson,may, 
in the absence of any express restriction as, to the operator, 
include consent to the operation of the car for the permitted 
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l1,seby another. This is all that was decided. in Feitelbergv. 
Matuson, 124 Misc. 595 [208 N.Y.S. 786], but, the court added, 
'~Of course, the liability of the owner cC2ses, when the bor-
rower, 'in turn,gives the use of. the car to a third party 
without the owner's consent." .Also the facts stnted in Grant 
v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158 [156 N.E. 650, 54 A.L.R. 845], 
clearly show that there was no express restriction by the 
owner of the truck upon the method or operation of the 
vehicle. As the court there said, although the driver had 
surrendered to, another the guidance of the wheel,he remained 
on the truck and "was still'the director of the enterprise, still' 
,the custodian of the instrumeritality confided to his keeping, 
still the master of the ship." ' 
In the case of Stapleton v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 129 
~isc. 772 (222N.Y.S.579L strongly relie~ upon by the appel~ 
.lants, the trial court held an owner liable although his per-
mittee had signed a lease by the ternisof which he expressly 
, agreed not to allow or permit any other person to operate the 
automobile. In violation of the covenant, he allowed another 
to.drive the automobile, through whose negljgence the accident 
occurred. Upon appeal, the judgment was reversed, the court 
holding that the use by a third person was not authorized by 
,theowner. (Stapleton v. Hertz DrivurselfStations, 131 Misc. 
52 [225 N.Y.S. 661]; accord: Owen v. Gruntz, 216 App.Div. 
, 19 (214 N.Y.S: 543].) 
In Kerns v. Lewis, 246 Mich. 423 [224 N.W. 647], no 
e;xpress limitation was imposed by the OwnCI of the vehicle as 
to who should drive it. But that case is not authority upon 
the question of the owner Corti's liability for a more funda" 
mental reason. Unlike the California legislation which im-
poses liability for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle 
"by any person using or operating the same with the permis-
sion, express or implied, of such owner," the Michigan law 
makes the owner liable if the "motor vehicle is being driven 
by the express or implied consent or knowledge of such, 
owner." In commenting upon this provision, the court said 
(p.425) : "Does the essential consent mentioned in the statute 
relate to the driver, or to the vehicle, 'being driven'? The 
statute makes the owner liable if the 'motor vehicle is being 
driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowl-
edge,' and we cannot read into it the restriction that the 
particular driver must be known by and his driving consented 
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to by the owner. The statute may be irastic, but we cannot 
render it less so by any permissible construction." 
The only case, from a foreign jurisdiction, cited by the 
appellants or by the majorityopiniQn, inwhich ~ny express 
restriction upon the person who might drive waslmposed·-by 
the owner is King v. Cann, 184 Wash. 554 [52 P.2d ,900]. IJ;l 
, that case, the court observed, "There was also some testimony, 
tothe effect that Mrs. Cann had told, young Holt, [th~ driver 
of the car at the time of the accident] tha(she 'would prefer 
that he did not drive the car:'" Thus thi case is, very similar 
to that or Haggard v. Prick, 6 CaI:App.2d' 392 ['44 P.2d4471, 
where the father merely expressed the wish to his ,son ,that, he 
'~~ould rather he would not let any otherper~on drj.ve", 'Ute 
,car. In addition, howeve'r, liability in the, King case waspredi-
eated, not upon any such statute as is hel'E'iiIrvolved;- but in 
accordance with the doctrine of· respondeat superi(Jr. In the 
wC)rds of the Washingt'on court, "WIiena.'member of the 
family has permission to use the car from the parents, as 
owners, in so unrestricted a manner as in the instant case, 
they must be held liable under the principle of agency; or 
respondeat superior, even though the member of, the family 
turned the driving of the car over to another who proyed 
incompetent or negligent." , 
And I can see no reasonable basis for characterizing the 
limited permission given by the owner of an automobile in 
connection with its use "secret restrictbns. "To :hold that an 
owner may not qualify his permission: and, restrict, it to a 
specified use of his automobile, modifies the statute in an 
important particular and makes him liable for consequences 
regardless of the, terms imposed by him ,and, accepted· by the 
borrower of the automobile. It also takes from the trier of 
fact the right to determine wheth~r, under the particular 
circumstances shown, the negligent driver was operating the 
automobile at the time of the accident with the permission, 
express or implied, of the owner. 
The' argument of the majority opinion against the recogni-
tion of what are termed "secret" restrictions upon the use of 
.It motor vehicle (see Bayless v. Mull, supra, p. 72), as I view 
the matter, is based upon a misconception of the ,liability 
established by section 402 of the Vehicle Code; One is not 
'bound by "secret" restrictions whell:"he,h~s'been indu~ed to 
act through reliance upon the apparent or ostensible autho~ity 
" 
i! 
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with.which a principal has clothed his agent. (See Civ. Code, 
sec. 2334.) But, obviously, an injured plaintiff did not allow 
the accident to occur through reliance npon the fact that the 
negligently operated vehicle .was being ~1Sed with rathcr than 
without the permission of the owner. And, in any event, the 
victim is not informed by the operation of an automobile, 
whether it is being driven by a permittee or a thief. More-
over, a limitation upon the purpose or '~xte11t of the permitted 
use is just as "secret" as is a restriction uT-.on the person who 
may drive the car. 
Much of the confusion in the consideration of the question 
of restrictive use under such statutes as section 402 of the 
Vehicle Code, and the classification of some restrictions as 
"secret" or "unreasonable," undoubtedly has arisen through 
the reluctance of the courts to recognize such limitations as 
those upon excessive speed or careless driYing. But the word-
ing of the r;;tatute, which makes the own~r responsible for the 
"negligence in operation" of his motor vehIcle, affords a more 
satisfactory basis for the exclusion of restrictions upon the 
manner of driving than a judicially created one dependent 
upon what a particular court may deem reasonable .. For the 
Legislature has taken from the owner .:he right to limit the 
extent of his permission under the statute to a non-negligent 
operation by express restrictions upon his permittee to drive 
'only in a safe, careful, or lawful manner. So long, therefore, 
as the owner, either expressly or impliedly, has consented to 
the purpose and extent to which the car may bil used and its 
operation by the person who is driving at the time of the 
accident, he is responsible for the negligence of that driver 
occurring while the car is being operatEJd within such pre-
scribed limits, regardless of any directions as to the manner 
of operation. 
Also, in my judgment, the majority ano concurring opin-
ions have unduly extended the meaning of the word "opera-
tion" as used in the statute. In order to impose liability upon 
Joseph Gigli, the negligent "operation" must have been that 
of Arthur, as he was "the person using )1' operating" the car 
with the qualified permission of the owner. The word" opera-
tion, , 'although broadly construed to hold that the permittee 
may be operatfug the car although not at the wheel so long 
as he remains in the car and retains supervision and control 
over the manner· of driving, has not been extended to fuclude 
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a situation where the permittee is no ionger in the car and 
therefore not in a positio~ to "direct or superfutend" the 
operation of the vehicle. (See Hicks v Reis, 21 Ca1.2d 694, 
659 [134 P.2d 788] ; Armstrong v. Sengo, 17 Cal.App.2d 300 
[61 P.2d 1188] ; Sutton v. Tanger, 115 Ca1.App. 267 [1 P.2d 
521]; Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158 [156 N.E. 650, 54 
A.L.R. 845] ; Feitelberg v. Matuson, 124 Mise 595 [208 N.Y.S. 
786] ; Owen v. Gruntz, 216 App.Div. 19 [214 N.Y.S. 543]; 
Stapleton v. Hertz Drivurself Stations Inc., 131 Misc. 52 [225 
N.Y.S. 661].) It is therefore clear that nnder the rule' of 
these decisions, the" ncgligence in the ->peration" of the Gigli 
machine was not that of Arthur, who was ridfug in another 
antomobile. 
In the foregoing discussion, I have assumed the correctneSs 
of the conclusion in the majority and concurring opinions 
that no evidence, or inference from the evidence, justified the 
trial court in finding that Corti was not the agent. of· Arthur 
Gigli at the time of the accident. As I read the record, it 
would support a conclusion by the trial court that the agency 
relation existed, in view of the fact that Arthur did not want 
to leave his father's car behind and also because he and Corti 
had decided that one of them should ride with the girls, as 
otherwise they might not "show up" at Rocca's. But, the 
testimony shows, it was Corti's suggestion that he drive the 
car. He was very insistent in his demand for it, and wished 
to use it as a means of transportation for his girl and himself; 
Certainly this evidence is entirely consistent with the finding 
of the trial court that Corti, at the time. of the accident, was 
not driving the Dodge car as the agent of either the father 
or the sou. 
Section 402 of the Vehicle Code imposes a liability upon 
the owner which did not exist at common law. It may be said 
with much reason that, in the interests of public policy, the 
owner of an automobile should be responsible for its negligent 
use regardless of who may be operating it at the time of the 
injury. But that is a matter for legislative and not judicial 
concern, and the statute here in controversy imposes liability 
only when the vehicle is being operated at the time of the 
accident with the consent of the owner. Whether in a given 
case the driver at fault had such permission is a question of 
fact. The trier of fact is .not bound to believe the testimony of 
an owner as to the restrictions imposed by him. upon the use 
, , 
! . 
474 ALLEN V. CAL. MUTUAL B. & L. ASSN. [22 C.2d 
of his car by the permittee, even though it be uncontradicted 
(Prickett v. Whapples, 10 Cal.App.2d 701, 703-705 [52 P.2d 
972]), and many times this court has affirmed judgments. in 
favor of the plaintiffs upon testimony as meagre as that WhICh 
supports the court's findings in the. present case. (Hicks v. 
Reis, 21 Ca1.2d 654 [134P.2d 788] ; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d 
457 [126 P.2d 868].) The application of the rule announced 
in those cases that any reasonable doubt should be resolved 
in favor of the conclusion by the trier of fact should not be 
limited to but one party to an action lmder that statute and, 
in my opinion, compels agreement with the finding that Corti 
was not the agent of Arthur Gigli. Of· course, if Corti was 
not the agent of Arthur, then obviously the former's use of 
the car at the time of the Mcident was not Arthur's use, and 
the entire structure upon which the majority and concurring 
opinions are predicated collapses, as undcl' no theory of con-
struction, could Corti's use then be said to be the one to which 
Joseph Gigli had consented. 
For these reasons I believe that the judgment should be 
affirmed as to both Joseph Gigli and Arthur Gigli. 
[So F. No. 16873. In Bank. July 8, 1943.] 
MRS. W. A. ALLEN et a1., Respondents, v CALIFORNIA 
MUTUAL BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION (a 
Corporation) et al., Appellants. 
[1] Appeal-Law of Case.-All questions and issues adjudicated 
on a prior appeal are the law of the case upon subsequent ap-
peals and will not be reconsidered. 
[2] ld.-Law of Oase-Decisions of What Oourt.-The doctrine 
that all' questions and issues adjudicated on a prior appeal 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1317; [2] Appeai 
and Error, §1326; [3] Appeal and Error, §1337; [4-6,14] Build-
ing and Loan Associations, § 16; [7,15] Appeal and Error, § 1329; 
[8] Appeal and Error, § 1333; [9,12] Appeal and Error, § 1344; 
[10,11] Limitation of Actions,§ 61(6); [13] Equity, § 37; [16] 
Appeal and Error, § 1328; [17-19] Building and Loan Associations, 
§ 18. 
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are the law of the case applies to decisions of the District Courts 
of Appeal after they have become final. 
[3] Id.-Law of Case-Sufficiency of Complaint.-Where the suffi-
ciency of a complaint is considered on a prior appeal, the doc-
trine of the law of the case does not apply if the. evidence does 
not support the allegations of the complaint. 
[4] .Building and Loan Associationg-:.Insolvency-Rights of Stock-
holders-As Investors.·-In an action to establish the claims 
of holders of certificates of a building and loan association in 
liquidation, plaintiffs proved a case '~ithin the decision on a 
prior appeal, where it was shown that the association and 
an agency company fraudulently induced. them to exchange 
their certificates for the company's stock, that they signed 
orders for the withdrawal of their deposits, which were cred-
ited to the company's purchase of the 'association's . guaran-
. teed stock, that the permits issued tu the company by the 
Corporation Commissioner' were conditioned upon the sale 
of stock for cash, but the company received no cash for 'its 
stock, and that the permits were riot exhibited to plaintiffs 
as required by their terms. . 
[5a,5b] ld.-Insolvency-Rights of Stockholders-Ail Investors.-
In an action to establish the claims as investors of certain cer-
tificate holders of a building and loan association in liquidation 
who had been induced to exchange their -certificates for the 
securit,ies of an agency corporation, the holding upon a ,prior 
appeal that investors who, by reason of fraudulent representa-
tions, made transfers of their certificates, or amounts repre-
sented thereby appearing upon the books of the association 
continued' to be iltheowners of their original certificates" and 
were entitled to share in subsequent dividends declared by 
the commissioner, ignored the meaning of the Building and 
Loan Association Act, § 13.16, and the purpose of its en8:ctmelitl 
[6] Id.-InsolvencY.,-Rights of Stockholders--Purpose of sta.tUte. 
-The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Building and 
Loan Association Act, § 13.16, and the 1935 amendment thereto 
(Stats. ~935, ~.1500; Deering's Gen .. Laws 1935 Supp., Act 986) 
was to hberalize the statutory requll'ements for the filing of a 
elaim in favor of one . who, as admitted by the books of the 
association, was an investor of the institution at the time it 
was taken over by the coi:nmissioner. 
[7] Appeal-Law of Case-Erroneous Decisions.:-In an action to 
establish the claims as investors of certain certificate holders 
of a, building and loan association in liquidation, whereon a 
prior appeal the court erroneously construed and applied, the' 
provisions of the Building and Loan Association Act, § i3~16, 
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